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We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price.
Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium.
The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of ￿rms and of the
insiders￿share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our
main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is
more likely under Bertrand competition if goods are substitutes and more likely
under Cournot competition if goods are complements.
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cwey@diw.de.1 Introduction
Traditional analysis of merger and takeover incentives in oligopolistic industries focuses
on conditions of stability. That is, it is asked whether insiders bene￿t from merging their
businesses instead of staying independent (e.g., Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983),
Davidson and Deneckere (1985), and Kamien and Zang (1990)). As a consequence, the
outsiders￿share of total industry gains due to a higher level of concentration plays no
role for predicting merger incentives. Besides neglecting information that may prove
useful for empirical studies, the stability approach yields rather extreme predictions.
Most notably, Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) ￿nd for the linear Cournot model
with homogeneous products that only a bilateral merger to monopoly is stable, while
Davidson and Deneckere (1985) show for the linear Bertrand model with di⁄erentiated
products that any bilateral merger is stable.1
This paper presents a model in which both the gains of insiders and those of outsiders
are important to predict the likelihood of further consolidation. We model the takeover
of a designated target as an auction in which the target chooses an optimal reserve
price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a simple and intuitive
prediction for the probability of a takeover. This probability is only a function of the
number of market participants and of the insiders￿share of total industry gains due to
the increase in concentration. Moreover, in the most interesting case where both insiders
and outsiders gain the probability of a takeover is always strictly smaller than one.
At the heart of our analysis is a public good problem among potential acquirers.
Typically, outsiders also gain from an increase in concentration. In fact, in many models
outsiders gain strictly more than insiders, implying that each ￿rm prefers that the target
is acquired by another ￿rm. But even if this is not the case, i.e., if there are substantial
gains to insiders, we show that the target￿ s optimal reserve price always creates a public
good problem. In the end, an acquirer is worse o⁄than any of the remaining independent
￿rms.
That consolidating an industry can give rise to a public good problem was already
recognized by Stigler (1990), who observed that such a problem should exist if outsiders
gain more than insiders.2 Our analysis reveals that the optimal strategy of a takeover
target may further exacerbate the public good problem. Also, our approach allows to
capture the public good problem in a way that makes it possible to derive positive
1Mergers can be made more attractive with alternative cost functions (e.g., Perry and Porter (1985)),
synergies (e.g., Farrell and Shapiro (1990)), or the possibility that businesses are operated as separate
entities (e.g., Kamien and Zang (1990), Tombak (2002)).
2The public good (or free-rider) problem with a takeover is related to the public good character of
entry deterrence in oligopolies (e.g., Bernheim (1984)).
1implications for the likelihood of a takeover.3
We further apply the results from our takeover model to analyze how ￿xed and
marginal cost savings may have di⁄erent implications for the likelihood of a takeover.
We also analyze in much detail the case of the linear Bertrand and Cournot models.
Here, we start by establishing standard stability conditions for a bilateral merger. In
doing so, we substantially extend existing results by covering di⁄erentiated goods as
well as both complements and substitutes. Amongst other things, we show that a
bilateral merger is pro￿table in an N-￿rms Cournot oligopoly with substitutes if and
only if products are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated. With our takeover model we also ￿nd that
further concentration is more likely under Bertrand competition if goods are substitutes
and more likely under Cournot competition if goods are complements. Moreover, the
probability of a takeover is decreasing in the degree of substitutability under Cournot
competition and increasing under Bertrand competition.
Our model further lends itself naturally to study the case where a takeover is prof-
itable for the consolidated ￿rm but reduces the pro￿ts of outsiders, e.g., as it sets free
large synergies that reduce marginal costs and, thereby, make the consolidated ￿rm more
competitive. If this is the case, we ￿nd that the target can set a very high reserve price,
extracting both the insiders￿gains and the loss a bidder would incur when remaining
an outsider. Our results in this case mirror some ￿ndings in the recent literature on
￿preemptive mergers￿ . Molnar (2000) and Fridolfsson and Stennek (2002) derive impli-
cations for the bid premium and for how the share price of insiders and outsiders should
react to a merger or takeover.4 Our major point of departure from this literature is that
we allow the target to set an optimal reserve price.
At a more general level, this paper is related to recent work by Jehiel and Moldovanu
(2000a,b). Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000a) study a licence auction with a free-rider prob-
lem among incumbents. Their paper focuses on determining the optimal number of
licences from the perspective of a regulator. Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000b) also study
auctions with bidders who subsequently compete in a market, which creates similar
externalities. Their paper focuses on the interplay of allocative and informational exter-
nalities.
3The analyzed public good problem may be of considerable practical relevance. For instance, at the
time of writing the ￿rst draft Japan￿ s Nippon Steel announced its intentions to tie-up with Sumitomo
Metal Industries and Kobe Steel, while there were also rumors of further consolidation in the US. These
developments considerably boosted share prices for European steel makers. At the same time, the heads
of Europe￿ s steel companies lamented about the slow pace of European consolidation (Financial Times
Europe, 13th December, 2001). Incidentally, around the same time rumors of further consolidation in
the depressed semiconductor industry lifted share prices of all competitors (Financial Times UK, 4th
December, 2001).
4Nilssen and Sorgard (1998) use preemptive mergers for a theory of merger waves, while Brito (2003)
analyzes preemptive mergers in a spatial model.
2The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce and analyze
the takeover game with reduced pro￿t functions. There, we also study the implications
of cost synergies. In Section 3 we apply our results to study the N-￿rms linear Bertrand
and Cournot case. Section 4 concludes.
2 The General Model
2.1 The Takeover Game
Consider an industry with N > 2 ￿rms, indexed by i 2 I = f1;:::;Ng, which produce
symmetrically di⁄erentiated products and have the same cost function. Each of these N
independent ￿rms realizes the same pro￿ts ￿N > 0. We are interested in the incentives
to consolidate by taking over a single target, which shall be ￿rm i = 1. If none of the
other N￿1 ￿rms chooses to take over the target, all N independent ￿rms remain active.5
If the takeover is successful, the number of independent ￿rms is reduced to N ￿ 1. In
the case of a takeover, the integrated ￿rm controls multiple products, i.e., that of the
target and that of the acquirer. The consolidated ￿rm realizes the pro￿ts ￿
N￿1
M . Each
of the remaining N ￿ 2 symmetric competitors still controls a single (unitary) product
and realizes the pro￿ts ￿
N￿1
U . Let ￿M = ￿
N￿1
M ￿ 2￿N be the gains that the acquirer
and the target ￿rm jointly realize by merging their businesses. Similarly, we denote by
￿U = ￿
N￿1
U ￿ ￿N the pro￿t di⁄erential for an outsider. Consequently, the change in
total industry pro￿ts is given by ￿￿ = ￿M + (N ￿ 2)￿U.
We model the takeover process as an auction in which the target can commit to
an optimal reserve price. This choice intends to incorporate two features shared by
many takeovers. First, an open competition between several bidders is a widely used
format. In fact, according to takeover regulation in (some states of) the U.S. the board
of directors is advised to structure the sale of the ￿rm￿ s assets as an auction. Second,
there is much evidence that the target can extract considerable rents from bidders. In
fact, Cramton (1998) compares the various tactics employed by the target ￿rm to the
choice of an (implicit) reserve price.
Our focus in the auction game is on the free-rider problem among potential ac-
quirers, though we also extend the analysis to cases of ￿preemptive mergers￿ , where
an acquisition imposes a negative externality on other ￿rms. In the presence of the
free-rider problem, an auction will not necessarily maximize the target￿ s pro￿ts in our
simple environment with complete information. Given the aforementioned prevalence of
5Hence, we do not consider the option that a ￿nancial bidder or a ￿rm operating in a di⁄erent market
steps in if an intra-industry takeover fails.
3auction-type procedures in takeovers, we feel that this does not restrict too much the
relevance of our results. We have more to say on this in Section 3.2. Also, we abstract
from many institutional details in the takeover process such as the consequences of a
dispersed shareholder base, toeholds, or the protection of minority shareholders.
The takeover process involves two stages. In the ￿rst stage, the target commits
to sell to the highest bidder if the respective price does not fall short of the reserve
price B. The reserve price is optimally chosen by the target. We comment below
on the assumption of commitment. In the second stage, the N ￿ 1 potential buyers
simultaneously submit bids. We restrict attention to subgame perfect equilibria where
bidders choose symmetric strategies and where ties are broken by randomizing with
equal probabilities. These restrictions essentially put all bidders in the same position.
We comment below on the existence of other equilibria.
2.2 Main Analysis
We denote the aggregate takeover probability by ￿. To focus on the public good problem
of a merger, we ￿rst assume that total industry pro￿ts strictly increase after a merger,
i.e., ￿￿ > 0. Further below we analyze the complementary case where ￿￿ ￿ 0.
Proposition 1. Suppose that total industry pro￿ts strictly increase after a takeover:
￿￿ > 0. Then the takeover game has the following equilibrium outcome:
(i) If insiders do not gain, ￿M ￿ 0, the takeover does not take place: ￿ = 0.
(ii) If insiders gain, ￿M > 0, and outsiders do not gain, ￿U ￿ 0, the takeover takes place





(iii) If both insiders and outsiders gain strictly, ￿M > 0 and ￿U > 0, the takeover takes
place with probability







Each potential acquirer bids the reserve price B with probability r = ￿M=￿￿ and does

















1 ￿ (1 ￿
￿M
￿￿ )N￿1 : (2)
Proof. Suppose ￿rst that ￿M ￿ 0. As ￿￿ > 0 holds by assumption, this implies ￿U > 0.
By ￿M ￿ 0 and ￿￿ > 0; it follows immediately that ￿ = 0. Suppose thus that ￿M > 0,
for which we distinguish between the two cases where either ￿U > 0 or ￿U ￿ 0.
Suppose now that ￿M > 0 and ￿U ￿ 0, which is covered by assertion ii). In this
case there is no free-rider problem as outsiders are not better o⁄ after the takeover. An
acquiring ￿rm j that pays a price P realizes the pro￿ts ￿
N￿1
M ￿ P, while its payo⁄ is
4￿
N￿1




U > 0 it then follows













U , the target is strictly better o⁄ than




U , it is
optimal for each ￿rm not to bid seriously, which makes this strategy strictly unpro￿table
for the target.
















M ￿ ￿N follows from ￿U ￿ 0. As a consequence of (3) an
acquisition at a price P > B is less pro￿table than becoming an outsider, implying that
no ￿rm will bid more than B. On the other hand, if a ￿rm is sure that no takeover takes
place, it would (at least weakly) prefer to bid up to B. By these considerations and as
we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria, we know that (i) each ￿rm bids B with
probability r and abstains from bidding with the residual probability 1￿r and that (ii)
r is determined by ￿rms￿indi⁄erence between the two strategies.
Note next that if a ￿rm is indi⁄erent between abstaining from bidding and bidding
B then it is clearly also indi⁄erent between abstaining from bidding and bidding B with
probability r. It proves convenient to use the latter indi⁄erence so as to determine r. If
a ￿rm abstains from bidding a takeover takes place with probability 1￿(1￿r)N￿2. The
￿rm￿ s expected payo⁄ is then
￿




U + (1 ￿ r)
N￿2￿
N. (4)
If a ￿rm decides to bid with probability r its expected payo⁄ is determined as follows.
From an ex-ante perspective, i.e., before the ￿rm randomizes whether to bid seriously
or not, takeover takes place with probability 1￿(1￿r)N￿1. Moreover, the ￿rm expects
to buy the target with probability [1￿(1￿r)N￿1]=[N ￿1].6 Hence, the ￿rm￿ s expected
payo⁄ from bidding seriously with probability r equals

















+ (1 ￿ r)
N￿1￿
N. (5)










1 ￿ (1 ￿ r)N￿1. (6)
6This expression is determined by the requirement that the sum of all ￿rms￿individual takeover
probabilities must sum up to 1 ￿ (1 ￿ r)N￿1.
5Condition (6) determines for each B satisfying (3) a unique equilibrium bidding proba-
bility r and vice versa. Substituting into the target￿ s payo⁄, which we denote by ￿, we
obtain
















Di⁄erentiating ￿ with respect to r yields next
d￿
dr
= (1 ￿ r)
N￿3(N ￿ 1)[￿M ￿ r￿
￿]. (7)
By (7) ￿ is strictly quasiconcave over 0 ￿ r ￿ 1. Using that ￿￿ > ￿M by ￿U > 0, we




Finally, substituting (8) into the probability of takeover ￿ generates (1).
To conclude the proof of assertion iii) it remains to rule out all values of B that do
not satisfy (3). For B > ￿
N￿1
M ￿￿N no ￿rm bids seriously, which is not optimal for the




U the reserve price would not bind and a take-over would
occur with probability one. That this is not optimal follows immediately from the fact
that (8) yields a strictly interior solution with r < 1. Q.E.D.
Case i) is straightforward. If insiders do not gain, there is no takeover. Below we
show that ￿M < 0 holds strictly if, for instance, goods are close substitutes in a linear
Cournot model. Take next case ii). If outsiders are (weakly) worse o⁄ if a takeover
occurs then there is no public good problem and takeover occurs with probability one.
In this case, the target needs not set a reserve price as competition between potential
acquirers allows to extract the maximum feasible payo⁄. Case ii) may occur, for instance,
if the integrated ￿rm can substantially reduce its marginal costs, which may intensify
competition and may allow the consolidated ￿rm to gain market share.
An interesting aspect of case ii) is that for ￿U < 0 all N ￿ 1 potential acquirers are
strictly worse o⁄ than in the status-quo case where N ￿rms compete. Precisely, each of
them realizes the pro￿ts ￿
N￿1
U , which by ￿U < 0 is strictly lower than ￿N. At the ￿nal




U all N ￿1 ￿rms would be strictly better o⁄if they could ￿agree￿
not to participate in the auction. But this is not a viable option as, provided that all
other N ￿ 2 ￿rms walk away, an individual ￿rm would be strictly better o⁄ by bidding
a price P = ￿N and realize the insiders￿gains ￿M > 0.
We now focus on case iii). Here, both insiders and outsiders strictly gain from a
takeover. Regardless of the relative size of these gains, ￿M and ￿U, it holds by (2) that
6the target sets the reserve price su¢ ciently high such that 0 < ￿
N￿1
M ￿ B < ￿
N￿1
U .
That is, while all ￿rms bene￿t from the takeover￿ i.e., the target, the acquirer, and
the outsiders￿ the acquirer is made strictly worse o⁄ than an outsider. Hence, there is
always a public good problem in the takeover process. As a consequence, the takeover
probability in (1) is strictly lower than one. In equilibrium, all N ￿ 1 ￿rms randomize
between bidding B and abstaining from bidding. When choosing its optimal reserve
price, the target thus faces the following trade-o⁄. Raising B increases pro￿ts if a
takeover takes place. Making a takeover less attractive for a potential acquirer reduces,
however, the likelihood with which a takeover occurs in the ￿rst place. More precisely, as
B increases and the pro￿tability of acquiring the target decreases, the overall probability
of a takeover must decrease su¢ ciently so as to make it still attractive for an individual
￿rm to put in a serious bid.
Below we investigate how various factors in￿ uence the probability of takeover. Given
Proposition 1 and, in particular, equation (1), we can then focus entirely on the deriva-
tion of the insiders￿share of total industry gains, ￿M=￿￿. We will use (1) to analyze ￿xed
and marginal cost savings, the di⁄erence between Bertrand and Cournot competition,
and the role of product di⁄erentiation.
Proposition 1 is restricted to the case where total industry gains from a takeover are
strictly positive. If this was not the case, there would be no free-rider problem among
potential acquirers.
We now turn to the opposite case where total industry pro￿ts do not increase by a
takeover. If insiders still gain from the takeover all outsiders must lose and the takeover
takes place with probability one. If insiders do not gain from the takeover it is intuitive
that there is always an equilibrium where the takeover does not take place. However, for
the case where outsiders do not lose less than insiders we also ￿nd symmetric equilibria
that lead to takeover with positive probability.
Proposition 2. Suppose that total industry pro￿ts do not strictly increase after a
takeover: ￿￿ ￿ 0. Then the takeover game has the following equilibrium outcome:
(i) If insiders still gain, ￿M > 0, the takeover takes place with probability one: ￿ = 1.





(ii) If insiders do not gain, ￿M ￿ 0, there always exists an equilibrium where the takeover
does not take place: ￿ = 0. If, in addition, ￿U > ￿M holds, this equilibrium is also
unique.
(iii) If neither insiders nor outsiders gain but outsiders lose not less than insiders, ￿U ￿
￿M ￿ 0, there exist also equilibria where the takeover takes place with positive probability:
￿ > 0. If potential acquirers can coordinate on a bidding equilibrium that is strictly
preferred by all bidders, no takeover takes place: ￿ = 0.
7Proof. Assertion i) is analogous to case ii) in Proposition 1. The existence of an
equilibrium with ￿ = 0 in case ￿M ￿ 0 is also immediate, irrespective of whether
outsiders gain or lose. We turn next to the existence of other equilibria in case ￿M ￿ 0.










U ￿ ￿N, which transforms to the requirement ￿M ￿ ￿U. Thus, ￿ = 0 is the
unique equilibrium outcome for ￿U > ￿M, which concludes the proof of assertion ii).
Suppose now that ￿U ￿ ￿M < 0. (The case where ￿U = ￿M = 0 is immediate.) We





and that all ￿rms bid B with probability r = 1. As the target is taken over with
probability one each bidder is indi⁄erent between bidding the price P = B or putting in
a lower (and, therefore, surely unsuccessful) bid. Moreover, a bidder is strictly worse o⁄
by putting in a higher bid. As B ￿ ￿N, which holds even strictly in case ￿U < ￿M, and
as any higher reserve price would lead to a sure failure of the takeover, the target can
also not do better. To complete the proof of assertion iii), note ￿nally that for any price
P that is acceptable to the target, i.e., any P ￿ ￿N, any potential acquirer is strictly
better o⁄ if the takeover fails with probability one. Q.E.D.
For ￿U ￿ ￿M < 0 there exist multiple equilibria that are not payo⁄ equivalent. This
multiplicity is due to a coordination failure among potential bidders. While they would
all be strictly better o⁄if none of them puts in a serious bid, it becomes pro￿table for each
￿rm to seriously bid for the target, provided that all other ￿rms do so. As outsiders lose
(weakly) more than insiders, bidding seriously becomes a pro￿table strategy, provided
all other ￿rms do the same. However, if bidders can coordinate, only the equilibrium
with ￿ = 0 survives.
If insiders gain and, following from ￿￿ < 0, outsiders lose, we have by assertion i)





and where the takeover takes place with probability one. Note that at this price the
acquirer and all outsiders realize the same pro￿t, which is strictly lower than ￿N. The
target, in contrast, is made strictly better o⁄ by the takeover and realizes a net gain of
￿M ￿￿U. That is, the target extracts both the insiders￿gain and the positive equivalent
of an outsider￿ s loss.
The case where ￿M > 0 and ￿U < 0 may occur if the takeover sets free synergies
that allow to substantially reduce the marginal costs of the combined ￿rm. This may
intensify competition and may allow the combined ￿rm to gain market share at the
expense of outsiders. The willingness of potential acquirers to bid for the target has
then two sources. They bid in order to realize the gains from the merger, as expressed
by ￿M > 0, and to avoid incurring the loss of becoming an outsider, as expressed by
8￿U < 0.
We conclude the general analysis with some ￿nal remarks on how cost synergies can
a⁄ect the probability of a takeover. In our model, there is a fundamental di⁄erence
between reductions in ￿xed and in marginal costs. To see this, suppose ￿rst that the
takeover decreases insiders￿￿xed costs, e.g., by reducing overhead expenditures. To cap-
ture this in a parsimonious way, assume that integrating their businesses allows insiders
to reap a windfall gain of f ￿ 0. At least in the short run, this should not a⁄ect ￿rms￿
strategies. If these ￿xed-cost savings are the only synergy gains, the takeover should
make outsiders strictly better o⁄due to the standard monopolization e⁄ect. By (1) this
implies that, regardless of the size of f, the takeover will not occur with probability
one. For high f it is now likely that these e¢ ciency gains more than compensate for
the welfare loss arising from the monopolization e⁄ect, in which case the likelihood of a
takeover is ine¢ ciently low. Suppose next that synergy gains result in lower marginal
costs. If these savings are substantial, this could allow insiders to increase their market
share while making outsiders strictly worse o⁄. We know from Propositions 1 and 2 that
the takeover then occurs with probability one.
2.3 General Discussion of the Takeover Model
We discuss next several speci￿cations of our takeover model.
Restriction to symmetric equilibria
Our key result is that of case iii) in Proposition 1. If both insiders and outsiders gain,
the public good problem in the bidding process, which is exacerbated by the target￿ s
reserve price, leads to a takeover with probability less than one. This result holds for
the symmetric equilibrium, where all N ￿ 1 ￿rms have the same chance of acquiring
the target. In case iii) of Proposition 1 there exist, however, also asymmetric equilibria
where some ￿rms are made the ￿primary acquirers￿and the remaining ￿rms abstain
from bidding. In particular, there always exists an equilibrium where one ￿rm i ￿ 2
takes over the target with probability one and pays the price ￿
N￿1
M ￿ ￿N. By selecting
this equilibrium we would obtain the extreme predictions that a takeover occurs with
probability one, regardless of outsiders￿gains, and that the chosen acquirer realizes zero
gains. Moreover, selecting this asymmetric equilibrium basically transforms the auction
into a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er made by the ￿target￿to a selected acquirer. With some
uncertainty over bidders￿private gains from the takeover this selection may not be so
straightforward to make. Moreover, the target needs considerable commitment power
with respect to the chosen bidder. (See also further below.)
The selection of symmetric equilibria is also relatively standard in the literature,
9e.g., in war-of-attrition games. Note also that the target may want to ￿solve￿the public
good problem by designating one ￿preferred￿bidder, but￿ unless we introduce a di⁄erent
game￿ such communication does not alter the equilibrium set.7
Commitment to a reserve price
One of the key features of our takeover game is that the target can commit to a
reserve price. Focusing again on Proposition 1, the reserve price is only important in
case iii), where both insiders and outsiders gain. As noted previously, the fact that the
target can choose a reserve price exacerbates the public good problem. What would be
the outcome without a reserve price, i.e., if the target was prepared to sell for any price
P exceeding its pre-merger pro￿ts ￿N? The following results are now straightforward to
establish using the proof of Proposition 1. If insiders￿pro￿ts are not lower than those of
outsiders, i.e., if ￿M ￿ ￿U, the takeover takes place with probability one and the target
realizes the price P = ￿N + (￿M ￿ ￿U). Otherwise, i.e., if ￿M < ￿U, a takeover occurs
with some probability that is strictly lower than one but that strictly exceeds that in
equation (1).8
Repeated auctions and long-term perspective
If a takeover fails to take place due to the free-rider problem, one may expect that
there should be another attempt to consolidate the market in the future. In other
words, as long as insiders gain one may expect that a merger should happen sooner
or later. Our view on this is two-fold. On the one hand, our one-shot model may
capture a short-run perspective. By reducing the probability with which a takeover
is realized in the single auction, the public good problem thus delays the process of
market consolidation process. On the other hand, however, if an industry or market is
constantly re-shaped by exogenous forces, prompting entry and exit, the public good
e⁄ect underlying Proposition 1 may well have permanent implications for the prevailing
degree of concentration.
Choice of a single exogenous target
Our paper follows much of the literature￿ though not all of it￿ in assuming that
there is a single exogenous target. That is, we only consider one possible round of
merger activity and we specify which ￿rm is the target. That there is only a bilateral
merger between ￿rms seems quite reasonable as multi-￿rm deals may be hard to arrange.
However, a single merger may be followed by another merger and so on. We leave the
7Harsanyi￿ s (1973) puri￿cation theorem provides a further rationale for selecting the symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibrium. It suggests to interpret the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the complete-
information bidding game as the limit of pure-strategy equilibria of a slightly perturbed game of incom-
plete information.
8Precisely, substituting B = ￿N we obtain the individual bidding probabilities r implicitly from
equation (6).
10application of our takeover model to sequential mergers to future studies. Moreover,
while it would be interesting to also endogenize the choice of the target, we think that
the case with an exogenous target is an important one.9 There may be many reasons
for why owners or managers value control and are thus hostile to a merger or takeover.
In this case, ￿rms become targets (only) due to exceptional circumstances such as a
generational transition in family-owned ￿rms, unforeseen adverse shocks that endanger
the ￿nancial viability on a stand-alone base, or the expulsion of an entrenched top-
management team.
3 Takeover Incentives under Bertrand and Cournot
Competition
Suppose that a representative consumer￿ s utility from consuming the quantity qi of ￿rm





















Products are substitutes (complements) if ￿ is positive (negative). We restrict attention
to values ￿ 2 (1=(1￿N);1)nf0g. By assuming ￿ > 1=(1￿N) we ensure that the ￿rms￿
problem stays strictly concave. For ￿ = 0 goods would be fully independent, implying
that a takeover would not a⁄ect pro￿ts. Finally, for ￿ = 1, where goods are perfect
substitutes, all pro￿ts would be zero in the case of Bertrand competition.
From the ￿rst-order condition determining the optimal consumption of good i we
obtain the inverse demand for product i:10
pi = ￿ ￿ qi ￿ ￿
X
j6=i
qj, for i;j 2 I, i 6= j. (9)
On the supply side, we assume that ￿rms can produce at constant marginal costs equal
to c, with ￿ > c ￿ 0.
3.1 Cournot Competition
Suppose ￿rst that ￿rms compete in quantities (Cournot competition) and denote the re-




U after a takeover.
9Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that, depending on the relative sizes of ￿U and ￿M, becoming the
(single) target can either be more or less attractive than becoming a potential bidder.
10See also Shubik and Levitan (1980).





U , where we ￿nd that ￿
N￿1;C
U > 0 holds for all ￿. That is,
outsiders always gain from a takeover. On the other side, it is well-known that insiders
may lose if goods are substitutes. That is, ￿
N￿1;C
M < 0 may hold for ￿ > 0.
With linear demand quantities are strategic substitutes in the sense of Bulow, Geanako-
plos, and Klemperer (1985) if ￿ > 0. Consequently, as a response to the anticipated
reduction of insiders￿output all outsiders will increase production, making a merger less
attractive for insiders. This e⁄ect is stronger the less di⁄erentiated are the substitutes,
i.e., the higher ￿ > 0. We ￿nd a threshold 0 < ￿C < 1 such that this e⁄ect dominates
and ￿
N￿1;C
M < 0 for ￿ > ￿C. Moreover, ￿C increases with the number of outsiders N ￿2.
The lower the insiders￿original market share, the smaller are the bene￿ts from a par-
tial monopolization by integrating the two ￿rms. Moreover, the larger the number of
outsiders, the smaller is the total reduction in output given outsiders￿non-cooperative
behavior.11
For ￿ < 0 the merged ￿rm optimally increases its output, taking into account the
positive externality between complementary goods. As ￿rms￿strategies are now strategic
complements, there is a positive ￿feedback￿e⁄ect as also outsiders increase production.
Consequently, insiders strictly gain in case of complements under Cournot competition.
We next summarize our results.
Lemma 1. In the case of Cournot competition, the takeover implies the following
changes in pro￿ts. Outsiders always gain, i.e., ￿C
U > 0, while there exists a thresh-
old value 0 < ￿C < 1 such that insiders gain only if ￿ < ￿C, i.e., ￿C
M > 0 if ￿ < ￿C,
￿C
M < 0 if ￿ > ￿C, and ￿C
M = 0 if ￿ = ￿C. Moreover, ￿C is strictly decreasing in N.
Proof. See Appendix.
To provide an example for the threshold ￿C, we obtain ￿C ￿ 0:56 if there are N = 3
￿rms in the market.
Lemma 1 is of independent interest as it complements previous results on the prof-
itability of a merger under Cournot competition with linear demand. With perfect
substitutes Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) have shown that a bilateral merger
is only pro￿table if it leads to monopoly, i.e., if N = 2. Lemma 1 establishes that a
bilateral merger can also be pro￿table if there are more ￿rms in the market, provided
goods are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated. Hence, if we take the standard approach and ask
whether a bilateral merger is stable, Lemma 1 gives a precise answer: The merger is
stable if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿C holds.
We now return to our takeover game, which uses not only insiders￿but also outsiders￿
11This is just another re￿ ection of the notable ￿nding in Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) that
for ￿ = 1 a bilateral merger is only stable if N = 2.
12gains to predict the probability of a takeover. Substituting equilibrium pro￿ts into
equation (1), we obtain the following result for the probability of takeover under Cournot
competition, which we denote by ￿C.
Proposition 3. In the case of Cournot competition, the takeover probability ￿C is
strictly decreasing over ￿ ￿ ￿C and satis￿es ￿C = 0 for all ￿ ￿ ￿C. Moreover, ￿C < 1
holds everywhere.
Proof. See Appendix.
As products become less complementary (over ￿ < 0) and more substitutable (over
￿ > 0), the takeover probability ￿C decreases. Moreover, the takeover probability is
always strictly smaller than one. This holds even though for values ￿ < ￿C insiders
strictly gain from the takeover. Recall that this is due to the underlying public good





there is a natural public good problem as outsiders gain more than insiders. Second,
this public good problem is exacerbated as the target sets a reserve that strictly exceeds
its pre-merger pro￿ts ￿N;C.
3.2 Bertrand Competition
Consider next the case of Bertrand competition in prices. We obtain from (9) the
individual demand functions
qi = max
￿(￿ ￿ pi)(￿(N ￿ 2) + 1) ￿ ￿(N ￿ 1)￿ + ￿
P
j6=i pj




Solving for the unique equilibrium with N independent ￿rms, we obtain the pro￿ts ￿N;B




U after a takeover. We refer again
to the Appendix for details.
With linear demand, the case of Bertrand competition mirrors that of Cournot com-
petition. If goods are substitutes prices are strategic complements, while if goods are
complements prices are strategic substitutes. Consequently and in sharp contrast to
the Cournot case, also insiders are better o⁄ under a takeover if goods are substitutes.
However, insiders can now be worse o⁄ if goods are su¢ ciently complementary.
Lemma 2. In the case of Bertrand competition, the takeover implies the following
changes in pro￿ts. Outsiders always gain, i.e., ￿B
U > 0, while there exists a threshold
value ￿B < 0 such that insiders only gain only if ￿ > ￿B, i.e., ￿B
M > 0 if ￿ > ￿B,
￿B
M < 0 if ￿ < ￿B, and ￿B
M = 0 if ￿ = ￿B. Moreover, ￿B is strictly increasing in N.
Proof. See Appendix.
To provide an example, we obtain ￿B ￿ ￿0:36 for N = 3.
13Lemma 2 again complements results in the literature on Bertrand competition.
Davidson and Deneckere (1985) show that mergers are always pro￿table if goods are
substitutes. Lemma 2 extends this result and shows that a bilateral merger is also prof-
itable if goods are complements, but only if the degree of complementarity is not too
high.
Again, if we only ask whether a bilateral merger is stable, Lemma 2 gives a precise
answer: The merger is stable if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿B holds. Turning again to our takeover
game and substituting pro￿t di⁄erentials into (1), we obtain the following results.
Proposition 4. In the case of Bertrand competition, the takeover probability ￿C is
strictly increasing over ￿ ￿ ￿B and satis￿es ￿B(￿C) = 0 for all ￿ ￿ ￿B. Moreover,
￿B < 1 holds everywhere.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4 provides a mirror image to Proposition 3, just as Lemma 2 was a mirror
image to Lemma 1. While a higher value of ￿ reduces the takeover probability in case
of Cournot competition, the opposite is now true in case of Bertrand competition.
3.3 Comparison of Cournot and Bertrand Competition
While the insider￿ s share of total gains decreases in ￿ under Cournot competition it
increases under Bertrand competition, implying that the respective takeover probability
decreases under Cournot competition and increases under Bertrand competition. Intu-
itively, the two probabilities ￿C and ￿B cross at ￿ = 0.12 Together with Propositions 3
and 4 we thus have the following result.
Proposition 5. If goods are substitutes, i.e., if ￿ > 0, the takeover probability is strictly
higher under Bertrand than under Cournot competition, i.e., ￿B > ￿C. The converse
holds if goods are complements, i.e., if ￿ < 0.
Proposition 5 formalizes the often expressed view that an increase in concentration
is more likely under Bertrand competition if goods are substitutes but more likely under
Cournot competition if goods are complements.
One often thinks about the choice between Cournot and Bertrand competition as
di⁄erent forms of market conduct. Bertrand competition is thought to represent more
intense competition than Cournot competition.13 From Proposition 5 it then follows that
a more competitive market conduct makes a takeover more likely if goods are substitutes,
but less likely if goods are complements.
12Precisely, using results from Propositions 3 and 4 and L￿ H￿pital￿ s rule, we obtain for lim￿!0 ￿B(￿)






13One well-known way to formalize this is by using a conjectural variation approach.
144 Conclusion
This paper introduces a framework to study takeover incentives that, in contrast to most
previous approaches, takes into account both insiders￿and outsiders￿gains from a higher
concentration. Under relatively standard symmetry conditions, we obtain a simple and
intuitive prediction for the likelihood of a takeover. The main case we analyze is where
both insiders and outsiders gain from a merger, for which our approach yields a simple
and intuitive prediction for the likelihood of a takeover. The likelihood is only a function
of the number of ￿rms and of the insiders￿share of total industry gains from a higher
concentration. The probability is always strictly smaller than one due to a public good
problem, which is exacerbated by the target￿ s optimal reserve price policy.
We also analyze the case where outsiders lose from a merger as it, for instance, sets
free substantial savings in marginal costs. In this case, the target may make substantial
pro￿ts and all other ￿rms, i.e., both the acquirer and the outsiders, can be strictly worse
o⁄ than in the status-quo case where no merger occurs. The acquirer is willing to pay a
substantial ￿premium￿in order to basically ￿preempt￿other ￿rms from taking over the
target.
We apply our results to provide a characterization of takeover incentives under both
Bertrand and Cournot competition, i.e., for an arbitrary number of ￿rms, for comple-
ments and substitutes, and for di⁄erentiated and homogenous goods. Under Cournot
competition, the insiders￿share of total industry gains strictly decreases as goods become
less complementary and more substitutable. The opposite holds under Bertrand com-
petition. Our model predicts a higher takeover probability under Bertrand competition
if goods are substitutes and a lower probability if goods are complements.
The focus of this paper is on takeover incentives and not on the normative implica-
tions of further consolidation. The public good problem may prevent or delay mergers
that are privately pro￿table but reduce welfare due to the resulting monopolization
e⁄ect. On the other side, it may also prevent mergers that substantially increase oper-
ating e¢ ciencies and, thereby, total welfare. Building on these observations, it could be
interesting to explore the welfare implications of legal provisions and corporate gover-
nance codes that restrict a target￿ s scope to extract higher rents from bidders, e.g., via
anti-takeover measures. An alternative route to analyze welfare implications could build
on our comparison of Cournot and Bertrand competition. For the case of substitutes
we found that a consolidation is more likely under Bertrand competition. On the other
hand, without a takeover ￿rms produce more under Bertrand, implying a higher welfare.
If Bertrand competition, i.e., a more competitive mode of behavior, is more e¢ cient if no
merger takes place but is also more likely to lead to further consolidation, the aggregate
(ex-ante) welfare results are not clear.
15Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The N independent ￿rms choose quantities to maximize ￿i = (￿￿c￿qi￿￿
P
j6=i qj)qi,







and the unique symmetric equilibrium quantities
qN;C = ￿￿c





￿(N ￿ 1) + 2
￿2
. (11)
If ￿rm j acquires the target, the integrated ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts equal
￿M = (￿ ￿ c ￿ q1 ￿ ￿qj ￿ ￿
X
k2Inf1;jg
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2 + ￿(N ￿ 1) ￿ ￿2
￿2
. (13)
We are now in the position to prove Lemma 1. It is straightforward to establish that
the pro￿t di⁄erential of outsiders satis￿es ￿C
U > 0, where we can use that ￿ > 1=(1￿N).
After some simple transformations we obtain that ￿C
M > 0 holds if and only if
N
2￿




3 ￿ 8￿ ￿ 4 < 0. (14)
Condition (14) is quadratic in N but has terms of ￿ to the power of three. We there-
fore choose the following indirect way of proving the assertions. Solving the quadratic
form (14) we obtain the two critical values
N1 = 1 + 2
 p




N2 = 1 ￿ 2
 p




(Note that we treat N as a continuous variable for the purpose of this and all the
following calculations.) That is, (14) holds for ￿ < 0 if N1 ￿ N ￿ N2 and for ￿ > 0 if
16N2 ￿ N ￿ N1. We ￿rst show that the term in rectangular brackets in (15) and (16) is
monotonic in ￿. Calculating its derivative reveals that, regardless of the sign of ￿, the
sign of the derivative is determined by the expression ￿￿3+￿2+2￿￿12￿2
p
(￿ + 1)(￿2￿
2￿+3), which is strictly negative given ￿ 2 [￿1;1]. Moreover, at ￿ = ￿1 we have N1 ￿ 2
and N2 ￿ 2.
We show next that the only binding condition for (14) is that N ￿ N1 must hod in
case ￿ > 0. Consider ￿rst the case ￿ < 0 and the condition N ￿ N2. Transforming
(16) and using ￿(N ￿ 1) > ￿1 shows that it is surely satis￿ed in case 4￿2 < 5 + ￿,
which always holds. Note next that for ￿ < 0 the condition N ￿ N1 follows directly as
N ￿ 3 and N1 ￿ 2. Take next the case of ￿ > 0, where N ￿ N2 holds from N2 ￿ 2.
It thus remains to consider the condition N ￿ N1, where we can use that N1 is strictly
decreasing in ￿. Moreover, for ￿ ! 0 it holds that N1 ! 1, while N1 = 1 +
p
2 < 3
holds for ￿ = 1. Combining these values for N1 at the boundaries with the monotonicity
of N1 in ￿ proves the existence of the asserted threshold 0 < ￿C < 1 as well as its
monotonicity in N. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Denote the probability of bidding the reserve price by rC(￿;N), where we make the
dependency on ￿ and N explicit. By Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 we obtain rC(￿;N) > 0
for all ￿ < ￿C(N) and rC(￿;N) = 0 for all ￿ ￿ ￿C(N), where we have made explicit
that the threshold ￿C(N) depends on N. Recall from Lemma 1 that 0 < ￿C(N) < 1
and that ￿C(N) is strictly decreasing in N. We show that for all N the probability








￿2(N ￿ 2)[￿(N ￿ 1) + 2]￿1(￿;N)




3(N ￿ 1) ￿ 2￿
2(2N
2 ￿ 4N + 3) + 6￿(N
2 ￿ 4N + 5) + 4(3N ￿ 5).
As ￿(N ￿ 1) + 2 > 0 follows from ￿ > 1=(1 ￿ N), drC=d￿ < 0 holds if ￿1(￿;N) is
strictly positive over ￿ 2 (1=(1 ￿ N);￿C(N)]. To show that this holds we prove ￿rst







2 + 12￿N ￿ 24￿ + 12. (17)
Auxiliary Claim. ￿2(￿;N) > 0.
17Proof. Suppose ￿rst ￿ > 0, in which case ￿2 > 0 holds if
N >
￿￿3 ￿ 8￿2 + 24￿ ￿ 12
4￿ (3 ￿ 2￿)
. (18)
It is thus su¢ cient to show that the right-hand side of (18) is bounded from above by
three. The right-hand side of (18) is lower than three if ￿3(￿) = ￿￿3+16￿2￿12￿￿12 < 0 .
Note next that d￿3(￿)=d￿ = ￿3￿2￿32￿+12, which is negative over ￿ 2 (0;(16￿2
p
55)=3)
and positive over ￿ 2 ((16 ￿ 2
p
55)=3;1], implying that ￿3(￿) < 0 is surely satis￿ed in
case it holds on the boundaries of the considered interval. (Observe that (16￿2
p
55)=3 ￿
0:39.) As we obtain ￿3(0) = ￿3 and ￿3(1) = ￿9=4, we have thus shown that ￿2 > 0
holds for all ￿ > 0.
Suppose next that ￿ < 0, where ￿2 > 0 holds if
N <
￿￿3 ￿ 8￿2 + 24￿ ￿ 12
4￿ (3 ￿ 2￿)
: (19)
It is thus su¢ cient to show that the right-hand side of (19) is bounded from below by
three, which holds if ￿3(￿) is strictly negative over ￿ 2 [1=(1 ￿ N);0). (Observe that
we can use ￿ < 0 and 3 ￿ 2￿ > 0:) Using that d￿3(￿)=d￿ < 0 for all ￿ < 0, ￿3(￿) < 0
holds surely over the considered range if it holds at the lower boundary 1=(1￿N) or at
some other value ￿ < 1=(1￿N). Given N ￿ 3 it is thus su¢ cient to consider ￿ = ￿0:5,
where we obtain ￿3(￿0:5) = ￿1. Q.E.D. (Auxiliary Claim)
Having shown that ￿2(￿;N) = d￿1(￿;N)=dN > 0 holds for all feasible values of ￿,
it remains to show for the lower boundary N = 3 that ￿1(￿;3) > 0. We obtain for
￿1(￿;3) the value ￿4(￿) = 2￿3 ￿ 18￿2 + 12￿ + 16. We show ￿rst that ￿4(￿) > 0 holds
for all feasible values of ￿. By N ￿ 3 it is su¢ cient to show ￿4(￿) > 0 for all values
￿ 2 [￿0:5;1]. From the derivative d￿4(￿)=d￿ = 6￿2￿36￿+12 we see that ￿4(￿) increases
for ￿ 2 [￿0:5;3 ￿
p
7) and decreases for ￿ > 3 ￿
p
7, where 3 ￿
p
7 ￿ 0:35. Hence,
￿4(￿) > 0 holds over the considered range if it is satis￿ed at the boundaries, which holds
by ￿4(￿0:5) = 5:25 and ￿4(1) = 12. This completes the proof of Proposition 3. Q.E.D.












j6=i qj = [￿ ￿ qi ￿ pi]=￿, this yields the demand functions (10). If no









, yielding the unique
equilibrium prices pN;B =
￿(1￿￿)+c(1+￿(N￿2))
￿(N￿3)+2 and the corresponding pro￿ts
￿
N;B =
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿(N ￿ 2) + 1)
(￿(N ￿ 1) + 1)
￿
￿ ￿ c
￿(N ￿ 3) + 2
￿2
. (21)

















. Solving for the unique




￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿(2N ￿ 3) + 2) + c(￿2(2N2 ￿ 8N + 7) + ￿(4N ￿ 9) + 2)





￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿(N ￿ 2) + 1) + c(￿2(N2 ￿ 4N + 3) + 2￿(N ￿ 2) + 1)
￿2(N2 ￿ 5N + 5) + ￿(3N ￿ 7) + 2
,




[(￿(N ￿ 3) + 1)(1 ￿ ￿)(￿(2N ￿ 3) + 2)(￿ ￿ c)]
2




[(￿(N ￿ 2) + 1)2(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ c)]
2
(￿(N ￿ 2) + 1)[(1 ￿ ￿)(￿(N ￿ 1) + 1)]￿2, (23)
with ￿ = ￿2(N2 ￿ 5N + 5) + ￿(3N ￿ 7) + 2.
We are now in the position to prove Lemma 2. Again it is straightforward that
outsiders gain, i.e., that ￿B
U > 0 holds for all ￿ 2 (1=(1 ￿ N);1). Substituting the
respective pro￿ts, we obtain that ￿B
M > 0 holds if
(1 ￿ ￿)￿1(￿;N)
(￿(N ￿ 1) + 1)(￿(N ￿ 3) + 2)
2 (￿2(N2 ￿ 5N + 5) + ￿(3N ￿ 7) + 2)
2 > 0, (24)
￿1(￿;N) = ￿
3(N(5N
2 ￿ 33N + 67) ￿ 43) + ￿
2(N(17N ￿ 70) + 69) + 16￿(N ￿ 2) + 4
As ￿ > 1=(1￿N) holds by assumption, the sign of the left-hand side of (??) is determined
by ￿1(￿;N).14 Observe ￿rst that ￿1(1=(1 ￿ N);N) = ￿2(N2 ￿ 2N ￿ 1)=(N ￿ 1)3 is
negative for all N. This follows as the quadratic form N2 ￿ 2N ￿ 1 has the two zeros
N = 1￿
p
2 and N = 1+
p
2 , where N = 1+
p
2 ￿ 2:41. As we also have ￿1(0;N) = 4,
there exists a threshold ￿B(N) < 0 such that ￿1(￿B(N);N) = 0. We show next that this
is the only zero of ￿1, which also implies ￿1(￿;N) < 0 for ￿ < ￿B(N) and ￿1(￿;N) > 0
for ￿ > ￿B(N).
Auxiliary Claim 1. ￿1(￿;N) has a unique zero.




2￿140N +138)+16N ￿32. (25)
We must now distinguish between N = 3 and N ￿ 4. For N = 3 we obtain ￿2(￿;3) =
￿12￿2 + 24￿ + 16, which has the two zeros ￿ = 1 ￿
p
21=3 and ￿ = 1 +
p
21=3, where
14Note also that the denominator is always strictly positive. In particular, for ￿ > 1=(1￿N) it holds
that ￿2(N2 ￿ 5N + 5) + ￿(3N ￿ 7) + 2 > 0.
191 ￿
p
21=3 ￿ ￿0:53 and 1 +
p
21=3 ￿ 2:53. This implies ￿2(￿;3) > 0 for the relevant
domain ￿ 2 (￿0:5;1) such that ￿1(￿;3) is strictly increasing and has thus indeed a
unique zero.
Suppose next N ￿ 4 and note ￿rst that the factor multiplied by ￿2 in (25) is now
positive. To see this, denote this factor by ￿3(N) = 15N3 ￿ 99N2 + 201N ￿ 129,
which has the derivative d￿3(N)=dN = 45N2 ￿ 198N + 201. As ￿
0
3 has the two zeros
N = (33 ￿ 2
p
21)=15 and N = (33 + 2
p
21)=15, where (33 + 2
p
21)=15 ￿ 2:81, and
as ￿
0
3(4) = 129, this implies ￿
0
3(N) > 0 for all N ￿ 4. Together with ￿3(4) = 51
it then follows that ￿3(N) > 0 holds for all N ￿ 4. Take next ￿2(1=(1 ￿ N);N) =
￿(3N3￿11N2￿3N +23)=(N ￿1)2, which is negative for all N ￿ 4. To see this, denote
￿4(N) = 3N3￿11N2￿3N+23, which has the derivative d￿4(N)=dN = 9N2￿22N￿3. As
￿
0
4 has the two zeros N = (11￿2
p





2:57, and as ￿
0
4(4) = 53, this implies that ￿
0
4(N) > 0 for all N ￿ 4. Together with
￿4(4) = 27 it then follows that ￿4(N) > 0 holds for all N ￿ 4. We can now determine
the behavior of ￿2(￿;N) in ￿ for N ￿ 4. As the factor multiplied by ￿2, i.e., ￿3(N),
is strictly positive and as we obtained for the left boundary ￿2(1=(1 ￿ N);N) < 0, the
quadratic form implies that, as ￿ increases, ￿2 is ￿rst negative and then positive. As
a consequence, ￿1(￿;N) ￿rst decreases and then increases in N. As we already noted
that ￿1(1=(1 ￿ N);N) < 0, this implies that ￿1(￿;N) has indeed a unique zero also for
N ￿ 4. This completes the proof. Q.E.D. (Auxiliary Claim 1)
To complete the proof of Lemma 2, we show that ￿B(N) is increasing in N. As the
threshold was de￿ned as the unique zero of ￿1(￿;N) = 0 over ￿ 2 [1=(N ￿ 1);1], we
can obtain monotonicity of ￿B(N) by implicit di⁄erentiation. For this purpose recall
￿rst that ￿1 cuts zero from below as we increase ￿, i.e., that the derivative satis￿es
at this point ￿2(￿B(N);N) > 0. De￿ne next the derivative w.r.t. N as ￿5(￿;N) =
d￿1(￿;N)=dN. The asserted monotonicity of ￿B(N) follows then if ￿5(￿B(N);N) < 0.15







2 + 16￿ + 67￿
3. (26)
To show that ￿5(￿B(N);N) < 0 we proceed indirectly and consider again the problem
￿1(￿;N) = 0, where we now solve for N for any given ￿. (In doing so we treat N
again as a continuous variable.) Note that we can restrict consideration to the values ￿
where ￿ = ￿B(N) is feasible. We show ￿rst that this restricts the domain of ￿ to values
￿0:4 < ￿ < 0. To see this, recall ￿rst that we derived 1=(1 ￿ N) < ￿B(N) < 0, from
15Note that d￿B(N)=dN = ￿￿5(￿B(N);N)=￿2(￿B(N);N), which shall be positive.
20which these restrictions on the domain follow for all N ￿ 4. Moreover, for N = 3 we can
show directly that ￿B(3) > ￿0:4. The latter assertion follows as ￿1(￿0:4;3) = ￿0:224,
while we have shown that ￿1(￿;3) is strictly increasing in ￿ and has thus its zero to the
right of ￿ = ￿0:4.
Note next that from ￿ > 1=(1 ￿ N) the solution to ￿1(￿;N) = 0 must satisfy
N < (￿ ￿1)=￿. It holds that ￿1(￿;0) = 4+69￿2 ￿32￿ ￿43￿3, which is strictly positive
for all ￿ ￿ 0, while we obtain at the upper boundary ￿1(￿;(￿ ￿ 1)=￿) = 2￿(1 ￿ 2￿2),
which is negative by ￿ 2 (￿0:4;0). We can thus already conclude that for given ￿
we obtain at least one zero denoted by N(￿), which satis￿es 0 < N(￿) < (￿ ￿ 1)=￿.
Moreover, at this zero it follows from the behavior of ￿1 at the boundaries N = 0 and
N = (￿ ￿ 1)=￿ that ￿1 cuts zero from above, i.e., that ￿5(￿;N(￿)) < 0. If we can
show that there is a unique zero for ￿1 in the feasible domain, it therefore follows that
￿5(￿B(N);N) < 0.
For uniqueness note ￿rst that ￿5 is a quadratic form in N, where the factor multiplied
by N2 is negative. We obtain ￿5(￿;0) = ￿70￿2 +16￿ +67￿3, which is strictly negative.







3=4 ￿ ￿0:43 is strictly smaller than the previously
derived lower boundary ￿0:4 for ￿. As we have shown above that ￿5(￿;0) < 0 and as
15￿3 < 0, which is the factor multiplied with N2 in (26), it thus follows that ￿5(￿;N) is
negative for low N and positive for high N. Together with the derived values for ￿1 at
the boundaries N = 0 and N = (￿ ￿ 1)=￿ this implies that ￿1 has indeed a unique zero
N(￿) at the considered domain. Q.E.D. (Auxiliary Claim 2)
This completes the proof of Lemma 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
Denote the probability of bidding the reserve price by rB(￿;N) and recall that
rB(￿;N) > 0 for all ￿ > ￿B(N) and rB(￿;N) = 0 for all ￿ ￿ ￿B(N), where 1=(1￿N) <
￿C(N) < 0 and ￿C(N) is strictly increasing in N. We show that for all N the probability







2(￿(N ￿ 3) + 2)(N ￿ 2)
[ 2(￿;N)]2  1(￿;N), with (27)
















2 ￿ 108N + 90
￿
+ 12N ￿ 20,
















2 ￿ 68￿N + 56￿ + 8N ￿ 12.
As ￿(N ￿3)+2 > 0 follows from ￿ > 1=(1￿N), drB=d￿ > 0 holds if  1(￿;N) is strictly
21positive over ￿ 2 (￿C(N);1].16
It now proves more convenient to show that this holds also on the extended domain
￿ 2 [1=(1 ￿ N);1]. At the lower boundary we obtain  1(1=(1 ￿ N);N) = (3 ￿ 3N +
2N2)=(N ￿ 1)3, which is strictly positive for all N ￿ 3. We show next that  1 is
strictly increasing over the considered domain, which completes the proof of Proposition
4. Di⁄erentiating  1 with respect to ￿ and rearranging terms, we obtain




2 ￿ 429N + 159) (28)
+￿(48N
3 ￿ 272N
2 + 472N ￿ 252) + 30N
2 ￿ 108N + 90:
It thus remains to show that  3(￿;N) > 0.
Auxiliary Claim.  3(￿;N) > 0.
Proof. We analyze ￿rst the factor multiplied with ￿2 in (28), which we denote by
 4(N) = 18N4 ￿ 144N3 + 390N2 ￿ 429N + 159. While it holds that  4(3) = ￿48, we
show that  4(N) > 0 for all N ￿ 4. For this purpose we repeatedly di⁄erentiate  4 to
obtain  
0
4(N) = 72N3 ￿432N2 +780N ￿429 and  
00
4(N) = 216N2 ￿864N +780. Note
next that  
00
4 has two zeros at N = 2￿ 1
6
p
14 and N = 2+ 1
6
p




implying that  
00
4(N) > 0 for N ￿ 4. With  
0
4(4) = 387 it follows next that  
0
4(N) > 0
holds for all N ￿ 4. Finally, together with  4(4) = 75 this implies that  4(N) > 0 holds
for all N ￿ 4.
Suppose now ￿rst that N = 3 such that the factor multiplied with ￿2 in (28) is
negative. Substituting N = 3 into (28) reveals that the respective quadratic form has
two zeros at ￿ = ￿3=4 and ￿ = 1. As we can restrict consideration to ￿ ￿ ￿1=2, it thus
follows that  3(￿;3) > 0 holds over the considered domain of ￿.
Suppose next that N ￿ 4 such that the factor multiplied with ￿2 in (28) is positive.
Again we can determine the zeros of the respective quadratic form in (28). We show that
the zeros are smaller than 1=(1 ￿ N), which completes the proof of the Claim. Observe
￿rst that  3(1=(1 ￿ N);N) = (8N3 ￿ 18N2 + 7N ￿ 3)=(N ￿ 1)
2. The numerator of
this expression equals 249 at N = 4, while it has the two zeros N = (9 ￿
p
39)=12 and
N = (9 +
p
39)=12; where (9 +
p
39)=12 ￿ 1:27. This obtains  3(1=(1 ￿ N);N) > 0.
Hence, if not both zeros of (28) lie to the left of 1=(1 ￿ N), they must both lie to the
right of 1=(1￿N), implying, in particular, that the vortex of the quadratic form lies to




12N3 ￿ 68N2 + 118N ￿ 63





16It can be shown that  2(￿;N) 6= 0 holds over the considered domain such that drB=d￿ is well
de￿ned.
22Note that the denominator of the left-hand side in (29) is just equal to  4(N)=3, which
we showed to be strictly positive for N ￿ 4. With this information we can transform (29)
to the condition  5(N) = 6N4 ￿16N3 ￿18N2 +67N ￿33 > 0: To show that this holds,
calculate the derivatives  
0
5(N) = 24N3￿48N2￿36N+67 and  
00
5(N) = 72N2￿96N￿36.
Note next that  
00
5(N) has two zeros N = (4 ￿
p





34)=3 ￿ 1:64. As  
00
5(N) > 0 for N ￿ 4 and  
0
5(4) = 691, we have  
0
5(N) > 0 for
all N ￿ 4. Together with  5(4) = 459 this proves that  5(N) > 0 holds for all N ￿ 0.
We have thus shown that (29) holds for all N ￿ 4 and that, therefore, the zeros of (28)
must lie to the left of 1=(1 ￿ N). This completes the proof for the case where N ￿ 4.
Q.E.D. (Auxiliary Claim.)
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
References
Bernheim, B.D., 1984, Strategic deterrence of sequential entry into an industry, Rand
Journal of Economics 15, 1-11.
Brito, D., 2003, Preemptive mergers under spatial competition, International Journal
of Industrial Organization 21, 1601-1622.
Bulow, J., Geanakoplos, J., Klemperer, P., 1985, Multiproduct oligopoly: Strategic
substitutes and complements, Journal of Political Economy 93, 488-511.
Cramton, P., 1998, Auctions and takeovers, in: P. Newman (ed.), New Palgrave Dic-
tionary of Law and Economics, London, Macmillan, Vol. 1, 122-125.
Davidson, C., Deneckere, R., 1985, Incentives to form coalitions with Bertrand compe-
tition, Rand Journal of Economics 16, 473-486.
Farrell, J., Shapiro, C., 1990, Horizontal mergers: An equilibrium analysis, American
Economic Review 80, 107-126.
Fridolfsson, S.O., Stennek, J., 2000, Why mergers reduce pro￿ts and raise share prices
- A theory of preemptive mergers, IUI Working Paper, Stockholm.
Harsanyi, J., 1973, Games with randomly disturbed payo⁄s: A new rationale for mixed-
strategy equilibrium points, International Journal of Game Theory 2, 1-23.
Jehiel, P., Moldovanu , B, 2000a, License auctions and market structure, University of
Mannheim, mimeo.
23Jehiel, P., Moldovanu, B., 2000b, Auctions with downstream interaction among buyers,
Rand Journal of Economics 31, 768-791.
Kamien, M.I., Zang, I., 1990, The limits of monopolization through acquisition, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 105, 465-499.
Molnar, J., 2000, Preemptive horizontal mergers: Theory and evidence, Working Paper,
Northwestern University, Evanston IL.
Nilssen, T., Sorgard, L., 1998, Sequential horizontal mergers, European Economic Re-
view 42, 1683-1702.
Perry, M.K., Porter, R.H., 1985, Oligopoly and the incentives for horizontal merger,
American Economic Review 75, 219-227.
Salant, S.W., Switzer, S., Reynolds, R.J., 1983, Losses from horizontal merger: The
e⁄ects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 187-199.
Shubik., M., Levitan, R., 1980, Market structure and behavior, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge/Mass.
Stigler, G.J., 1950, Monopoly and oligopoly by merger, American Economic Review
Papers and Proceedings 40, 23-34.
Tombak, M.M., 2002, Mergers to monopoly, Journal of Economics & Management
Strategy 11, 513-546.
24